Democratic National Committee v. Republican National Committee by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-7-2019 
Democratic National Committee v. Republican National 
Committee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Democratic National Committee v. Republican National Committee" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 12. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/12 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1215 
____________ 
 
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE;  
NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE;  
VIRGINIA L. FEGGINS;  
LYNETTE MONROE 
 
v. 
 
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE;  
NEW JERSEY REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE;  
ALEX HURTADO;  
RONALD C. KAUFMAN;  
JOHN KELLY 
 
               Democratic National Committee, 
 
                                    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2-81-cv-03876) 
District Judge: Hon. John M. Vazquez 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2018 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 7, 2019) 
 
 
 
  
2 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 The Democratic National Committee and Republican National Committee entered 
into a Consent Decree on November 1, 1982 to resolve a 1981 lawsuit. Less than two 
weeks prior to the 2016 presidential election, the DNC filed a motion to hold the RNC in 
contempt for an alleged violation of the Decree. After fifteen months of discovery, the 
District Court determined that the DNC had not shown a violation of the Consent Decree. 
The DNC appeals several discovery orders and the order declaring the Decree expired. 
We will affirm. 
I. 
A. The Consent Decree 
 Following the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the DNC sued the RNC 
and the New Jersey Republican State Committee (NJRSC) for intimidation of minority 
voters. The suit was resolved by a settlement that included the Consent Decree at the 
center of this case.1 This Court has acknowledged that the prevention of intimidation and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 App. 514 (Consent Order, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 
No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982)). 
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suppression of minority voters is the “central purpose” of the Consent Decree and its later 
modifications.2  
The Consent Decree prevents the RNC and NJRSC from engaging in “ballot 
security” programs, defined as “any program aimed at combatting voter fraud by 
preventing potential voters from registering to vote or casting a ballot.”3 It does not ban 
“normal poll watching functions.”4 The Decree was modified in 2009 to state that it 
would expire on December 1, 2017, unless the DNC proved a violation of the Decree. If 
the DNC proved a violation, the Decree would be extended eight years. 
B. The Trump Campaign and Alleged RNC Coordination 
Less than two weeks before the 2016 presidential election, the DNC filed an 
emergency motion to hold the RNC in contempt, alleging that the RNC was violating the 
Decree by coordinating ballot security efforts with the campaign of then-candidate 
Donald Trump. The motion requested that the District Court issue a preliminary 
injunction to enjoin the RNC from participating in or encouraging ballot security 
activities.  
                                              
2 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1138 (2013). 
3 App. 18 (D. Ct. Op.). 
4 App. 17-18. 
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The DNC alleged that the RNC actively supported voter suppression tactics 
endorsed by the Trump campaign.5 Then-RNC Chair Reince Priebus made statements 
that the RNC was in “full coordination” with the Trump campaign in the weeks and 
months leading up to the election.6 The DNC alleged that the RNC’s coordination with 
the campaign included efforts to intimidate and suppress minority voters. In response, the 
RNC repeatedly asserted it did not engage in any poll watching activities, even activities 
that would be permitted by the Decree. The DNC concedes that RNC lawyers informed 
RNC staff that the RNC could not engage in ballot security activities.  
The DNC made a discovery request the day after it filed its initial motion. The 
District Court issued two discovery orders in quick succession, ordering the RNC to 
produce agreements between it and the Trump campaign related to voter fraud, ballot 
security, and RNC poll-watching. Three days before the election, the District Court 
denied the DNC’s requested preliminary injunction but permitted discovery to continue. 
 Discovery continued until January 2018, when the District Court determined that 
the DNC had not shown a violation of the Consent Decree by a preponderance of the 
                                              
5 At rallies, Trump made statements such as: “[G]o around and watch other polling 
places,” App. 536; “[It’s] so important that you watch other communities, because we 
don’t want this election stolen from us,” App. 538; and “You’ve got to get everybody to 
go out and watch . . . . And when I say ‘watch,’ you know what I’m talking about. 
Right?” App. 546. The Trump campaign website contained a form allowing supporters to 
register as “Trump Election Observers.” App. 548. 
6 App. 599. 
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evidence. The court issued orders denying a final discovery request and declaring the 
Consent Decree expired. The DNC appeals.   
II. 
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the original suit.7 It 
retained jurisdiction to review and enforce the Consent Decree.8 This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over an appeal from the Consent Decree by its terms.9 “We review a district 
court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb such an order absent 
a showing of actual and substantial prejudice.”10 We review a district court’s decisions on 
whether to modify or vacate a consent decree for abuse of discretion.11 
                                              
7 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
8 Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 440 (2004) (“Federal courts are not reduced to 
approving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, a consent decree 
may be enforced.”). 
9 The Decree contained an explicit reservation of appellate jurisdiction over the 
enforcement of the settlement terms, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Keefe v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that courts have 
jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements incorporated into orders). 
10 Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). 
11 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 201 (citing Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel 
for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
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III. 
 The DNC argues that the District Court abused its discretion in entering eight 
orders limiting discovery12 and one order declaring the Decree expired.13 However, 
looking at the scope of discovery in its totality and at the individual orders that the DNC 
challenges, it is clear that the court acted within its broad discretion.  
 Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the general scope 
for discovery. However, that scope is prefaced by language giving district courts 
discretion to limit discovery: “Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 
discovery is . . . .”14 The court may limit discovery to ensure its scope is proportional to 
the needs of a case, and the court considers, among other factors, “whether the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”15 Whether a court 
reasonably limited the scope of discovery is necessarily a fact-based inquiry.  
 Because district courts have their eyes and ears on a case from start to finish, they 
are in the best position to “reach[] a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope 
of discovery.”16 For that reason, we choose not to second-guess discovery orders except 
                                              
12 The DNC challenges discovery orders dated October 31, 2016 (Dkt. No. 113); 
November 2, 2016 (Dkt. No. 118); November 5, 2016 (Dkt. Nos. 139); January 4, 2017 
(Dkt. No. 146); July 7, 2017 (Dkt. No. 167); September 29, 2017 (Dkt. No. 182); 
November 29, 2017 (Dkt. No. 197); and January 8, 2018 (Dkt. No. 212). 
13 Order dated January 8, 2018 (Dkt. No. 213). 
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
15 Id.  
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
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where the court has abused its discretion.17 “To demonstrate that a district court abused 
its discretion, an appellant must show that the court’s decision was ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or 
clearly unreasonable.’”18  
The District Court reasonably limited the scope of the DNC’s individual discovery 
requests. The DNC isolates instances where discovery was denied as evidence of an 
abuse of discretion. For example, it highlights the court’s refusal of its request to depose 
Reince Preibus. But in denying that request, the court concluded that Preibus’s statements 
about knowing the Trump campaign’s position on voter fraud did not suggest any 
discussions of ballot security efforts. After the court allowed the DNC to depose then-
RNC Communications Director Sean Spicer, the DNC requested to depose Mike Roman, 
the alleged “front man for the Trump Campaign’s efforts against voter fraud.”19 In 
denying that request, the court determined that there was no evidence from Spicer’s 
deposition or at any point on the record that the RNC was working with Roman.  
                                              
17 The DNC relies upon an inapposite case from the Ninth Circuit to try to soften 
the standard. Appellant’s Br. 29-31 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 
1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Leavitt court exercised de novo review rather than 
reviewing for an abuse of discretion because “the district court only implicitly denied the 
request to authorize discovery” and therefore failed to exercise its discretion at all. 
Leavitt, 523 F.3d at 1031-32. This case involves thorough, explicit rulings on discovery 
disputes by the District Court, so Leavitt’s reasoning is not applicable.  
18 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 201 (quoting Moyer v. United Dominion 
Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
19 App. 479. 
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The DNC also points to its denied request to depose Pennsylvania State 
Republican Party officials Tommy Knepper and Rob Gleason. However, the court 
correctly noted that the emails in support of the request regarding Tommy Knepper were 
related to voter turnout rather than ballot security activities, and Rob Gleason submitted a 
declaration that he was acting in his capacity as Chair of the Pennsylvania State 
Republican Party, not as a member of the RNC.20  
The DNC additionally asserts that the District Court erred in not allowing them to 
depose Nevada poll watchers and a representative from Stampede. The District Court had 
good reason for not permitting the depositions. The District Court was provided with a 
declaration that stated that the RNC had no poll-watching operation in Nevada, and 
discovery revealed that Stampede was performing permissible, non-ballot security work 
in Florida and no services for the RNC in Nevada. The District Court also had evaluated 
information presented to it concerning the DNC's need for a document demand for 
communications between the RNC and JTD Strategies and determined the information 
was insufficient to require production of the information the demand sought. The DNC 
                                              
20 The District Court stated that to hold Rob Gleason accountable to the Decree 
would require the conclusion that all fifty state party chairs are subject to the Decree. 
App. 38-39. The court noted that there is no support for that broad a reading in the 
Decree or opinions interpreting it; rather, Judge Debevoise, the presiding judge for 
previous Decree disputes, expressly rejected that interpretation. Accordingly, Gleason’s 
alleged actions were and are irrelevant and thus did not warrant a deposition. 
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did not raise a single challenge that was not carefully and appropriately considered by the 
District Court. 
The District Court’s handling of discovery on the whole suggests anything but 
“arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable” decision making. In total, the court reviewed 
more than thirty filings in fifteen months. It heard on-the-record argument in nine 
separate instances, issuing nine written orders in response. The court afforded the parties 
the opportunity to be heard, thoughtfully considered their arguments, and provided 
detailed explanations of its decisions. Those decisions were couched within the burden 
versus benefit framework of Rule 26(b)(1). Further, the court required the RNC to review 
tens of thousands of pages of its own records, which resulted in the production of 
thousands of pages to the DNC. The court neither abused its discretion in its handling of 
discovery as a whole, nor abused its discretion with regard to any individual discovery 
request. 
The DNC fails to support its challenge of the District Court's order declaring the 
Decree expired by its terms with any argument that the court abused its discretion. The 
DNC hangs its hat on its challenges to the discovery orders, arguing that if we find that 
the court abused its discretion on discovery, then we should also find that the Decree 
could not be ordered expired. However, because the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion on discovery, it follows that it did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the 
Decree had expired. 
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While it is possible that another court would have allowed further discovery or 
managed the case differently, we review only for abuse of discretion. The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion, and we will not upset its thoughtful adjudication of the 
matter.  
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
